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5‘Alert, alive and sensitive’: Baker, the
Duty to Give Reasons, and the Ethos
of Justification in Canadian Law
MARY LISTON*
It follows that I disagree with the Federal Court of Appeal’s holding … that a
section 114(2) decision is ‘wholly a matter of judgment and discretion’ … The
wording of section 114(2) and of the Regulations shows that the discretion
granted is confined within certain boundaries. … While deference should be
given to immigration officers on section 114(2) judicial review applications,
decisions cannot stand when the manner in which the decision was made and
the approach taken are in conflict with humanitarian and compassionate values.
The Minister’s guidelines themselves reflect this approach. … The principles
discussed above indicate that, for the exercise of the discretion to fall within
the standard of reasonableness, the decision-maker should consider the chil-
dren’s best interests as an important factor, give them substantial weight, and
be alert, alive and sensitive to them (emphasis added).1
INTRODUCTION
AN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION was made in a manner thatwas not ‘alert, alive and sensitive’2 to the interests of Mavis Baker’sCanadian-born children. L’Heureux-Dubé J’s remarkable phrase, 
I will argue, comports with an emergent understanding of Canadian 
public law as an ‘ethos of justification’3 where citizens and residents are
* I would like to thank Jennifer Nedelsky, Lorne Sossin and James Tully for their extremely
helpful comments. Special thanks go to David Dyzenhaus for his encouragement and 
assistance—and for not ‘pulling any punches’ when reviewing an earlier draft. Finally, I wish
to acknowledge the unstinting support given to me by my partner, David Duff.
1 L’Heureux-Dubé J writing for the Canadian Supreme Court in Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 74–75 (citations omitted) [here-
inafter Baker]. Mavis Baker was an immigrant who overstayed her visa and became subject to
a deportation order after 11 years of illegal residence as a live-in domestic worker in Canada.
During this time, she had four Canadian children and at the later part of her residency suffered
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democratically and often constitutionally entitled to participate in decisions
which affect their rights, interests and privileges as well as to have access to
and understand the reasons for these decisions. Indeed, Baker has affirmed
that any administrative decision which affects the rights, privileges or inter-
ests of an individual will trigger the application of a duty of fairness whose
content may include the duty to give reasons.4 Within this ethos of justifi-
cation, the legal relationship between the individual and the state rests on
fundamental normative considerations of dignity, rationality and respect.
Throughout this chapter, I will use the weighty phrase ‘alert, alive and
sensitive’ as a shorthand to describe the ethos of justification. I will con-
sider both the characteristics of and values suggested by this ethos and 
discuss the methodology that has emerged to complement this mode of
analysis and judgement. I will then explore its connection with the duty to
give reasons. I want to suggest that this ethos can be used to inform other
decision-making contexts than the judicial and that it will therefore have
relevance to related domains of administrative decision-making and even
community decision-making as an ethical framework for evaluating and
arriving at good judgements about good administration.
The paper will first present and analyse the Baker methodology and
what such a standard entails for decision-making. Then I will briefly
describe how this ethical standard has appeared in pre-Baker caselaw
before turning to examine several key post-Baker cases in section 
three. Section four conducts an assessment of the Baker landscape and dis-
cusses possible trends for Canadian administrative law. I will conclude by
suggesting how the Baker ethos and its unified methodology complement
and conform to a larger democratic, justificatory culture. The key claim
that I make here is that this ethical standard functions to govern power
relationships throughout the Canadian polity, a polity which has embraced
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post-partum psychosis, went on welfare, and had her children removed from her care. She
submitted a humanitarian and compassionate grounds application to remain in Canada which
was denied without reasons until, at counsel’s request, she was provided with notes relevant to
the decision which revealed inflammatory and impolitic language on the part of the investigat-
ing officer. S 114(2) was the relevant provision in the Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I–2
(repealed, now article 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, RSC 2001, c 27).
2 See also Baker at para 73 which rephrases the introductory quote: ‘I conclude that because
the reasons for this decision do not indicate that it was made in a manner which was alive,
attentive, or sensitive to the interests of Ms Baker’s children, and did not consider them as an
important factor in making the decision, it was an unreasonable exercise of the power con-
ferred by the legislation, and must, therefore, be overturned’ (emphasis added).
3 I have borrowed this phrase from Supreme Court Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin in her
article ‘The Role of Administrative Tribunals and Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law’
(1999) 12 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice 171–89 at 174. I owe a much
larger debt to the work of David Dyzenhaus as found in ‘The Politics of Deference: Judicial
Review and Democracy’ in M Taggart (ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford,
Hart Publishing, 1997) at 278–307 and ‘Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception
of Legal Culture’ (1998) 14 South African Journal of Human Rights 11.
4 Baker, n 1 at para 20.
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constitutional democracy and the rule of law as permanent tenets of 
this ethos.
EMBODYING BAKER: THE ETHOS OF ALIVE, 
ALERT AND SENSITIVE
The essence of the Baker decision, I claim, is the entrenchment of a unified
methodological approach to the judicial review of discretionary decisions
compatible with a notion of participatory democracy. In this section, I will
explore two aspects of this methodological approach. First, I will describe
the methods used in Baker for the review of discretionary decision-making
and for the detection and protection of fundamental interests. Second, 
I will discuss the aims and concepts, the principles of reasoning, and the
institutional relationships implicated in the Baker ethos.
1. The Methods Behind the Methodology, or, the Skeleton
From one perspective, it would seem that the Supreme Court in Baker used
three different, distinct and unrelated methods to determine different aspects
of the duty of fairness within the context of the case. From another perspec-
tive, and one that I advance, each is a particular application of a unified
approach to reviewing discretionary decision-making in administrative 
law—an approach usually labelled ‘pragmatic and functional’.5 This section
will set out the three methods within the overall methodology: determining
the context of the procedural duty of fairness in an administrative context;
selecting and applying a standard of review in an administrative context;
and, discerning the presence of bias in an administrative decision.
(A) The Content of the Duty of Fairness
To understand the content of the procedural duty of fairness in Baker, the
Supreme Court used the ‘pragmatic and functional analysis’ to outline five
factors which assist in determining fairness in context6: 1) comparing how
institutionally analogous the administrative process is to the judicial in
order to determine how close the procedural protections are to those found
in the trial model; 2) examining the statutory scheme to review potential
violations of justice in administrative processes which have either no inter-
nal appeal procedures or where the decision is determinative; 3) ensuring
that the procedural protections afforded conform to the importance of the
Baker, the Duty to Give Reasons 115
5 Ibid at paras 51–56.
6 Ibid at paras 21–27.
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decision to the person(s) affected and, where the impact is greater, more
stringent procedural protections will be required; 4) attending to the legiti-
mate expectations of the person challenging the decision and according
substantive procedural protection where the claimant had a legitimate
expectation that a certain result might have been reached when, for example,
representations regarding procedures, regular practices, or substantive
promises have been contravened without significant or sufficient proce-
dural protections7; and, 5) acknowledging and respecting the procedures
deemed appropriate by the administrative agency where the agency has the
ability and the expertise to choose its own procedures.
These factors are not exhaustive and others may apply in contexts where
the duty of fairness is not related to participatory rights. Of these factors at
play in Baker, factor four, the doctrine of legitimate expectations, was
rejected outright in the decision and therefore did not affect the content of
the duty of fairness.8
(B) The Standard of Review
A comparable set of methodological guides governs the selection and appli-
cation of the three standards of review for errors of law in discretionary
administrative decisions. Here the pragmatic and functional approach
requires the reviewer to consider: 1) the absence or presence of a privative
clause; 2) the expertise of the decision-maker; 3) the purpose of the provi-
sion and the Act in which it is found and a) whether open-textured legal
principles are at play as well as b) whether the interest involved is individ-
ual or polycentric; and, 4) whether the decision is highly discretionary and
fact-based.9
Greater deference is shown in the choice of the standard of patently
unreasonable while greater intervention is signalled in the choice of correct-
ness review. Reasonableness, the intermediate standard, was used in Baker
because of the nature of decision-making in the immigration context.
(C) The Test for the Reasonable Apprehension of Bias
Lastly, the Supreme Court employed a reasonable person standard in Baker
to access the values underlying the duty of fairness in the context of a
potentially biased discretionary decision putatively made on humanitarian
grounds. Importantly, the standard itself was part of the set of guidelines
issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada for immigration officers.10
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7 But, as L’Heureux- Dubé J hastened to affirm, legitimate expectations in Canadian jurispru-
dence ‘cannot lead to substantive rights outside the procedural domain.’ Ibid at para 26.
8 Ibid at para 29.
9 Ibid at paras 57–62.
10 Ibid at para 16.
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As with the other two tests, the test for apprehension of bias will vary
according to context and the type of function performed by the administra-
tive decision-maker involved.11
Employing this standard, the court examined whether or not the immi-
gration officer’s notes were biased and therefore disclosed an impartial or
arbitrary decision. Looking to the form and content of the officer’s notes,
L’Heureux- Dubé J stated that his ‘notes, and the manner in which they are
written, do not disclose the existence of an open mind or a weighing of the
particular circumstances of the case free from stereotypes.’12 As a result,
‘the well-informed member of the community would perceive bias when
reading Officer Lorenz’s comments.’13 The contextual nature of the
methodology is important here for Baker not only subjects specific behav-
iour of the officials involved but the entire chain of reasoning to scrutiny.14
(D) The Unifying Proposition within these Three Methods
Each one of these tests aims to conform to an ideal of what the Supreme
Court calls ‘deference as respect,’15 meaning that courts will respect admin-
istrative autonomy where decisions affecting important interests are rea-
sonable. If an agency exhibits competency and good reasoning concerning a
procedural or substantive issue, the complementary institutional response
from the judiciary is to respect that institutional capability. Several underly-
ing methodological aims and principles need to be unpacked from the con-
ception of deference as respect.
2. Methodological Aims, or the Vitals
The three tests discussed in subsection one above allude to substantive
underlying values in the duty of procedural fairness in which the demo-
cratic right to participate in decisions and laws affecting one’s rights and
interests is paramount. On this point, L’Heureux-Dubé J writes:
I emphasize that underlying all these factors is the notion that the purpose of
participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to
Baker, the Duty to Give Reasons 117
11 Ibid at para 47. However, this test is a bit ‘looser,’ more discretionary, that the two
approaches discussed above since it is not directed by an explicit set of considerations but,
rather, imaginatively guided by the abstract personification of the ‘reasonable Canadian.’
12 Ibid at para 48.
13 Ibid.
14 Indeed, on a more formalistic approach, these two developments—concluding that the notes
counted as reasons and subjecting the chain of reasoning to scrutiny—might well have been
obstructed.
15Baker at para 65 quoting David Dyzenhaus’s notion of deference as respect: deference ‘requires
not submission but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in sup-
port of a decision.’ Quote taken from D Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of Deference,’ n 3 at 286.
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ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open 
procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institu-
tional, and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the deci-
sion to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered
by the decision-maker.16
Given this language, there is an obvious and tight connection between the
values contained in the duty of fairness, the duty to give reasons, and the
idea of the rule of law. The nexus of values hinges on the insight that no
one is infallible and that no power is or ought be unbounded; humans exist
in a world of limitation, much of it self-created and self-imposed.17
‘Second-guessers’18 are therefore necessary to scrutinise the content of and
procedures used in discretionary decision in order to recognise and affirm
whether or not fairness and reasonableness are sufficiently present.19
The kind of decision involved in Baker was one that required an 
‘open mind’20 due to its individualised nature, the humanitarian and com-
passionate requirements as stipulated in the department’s own guidelines,
and its evocation of a disposition characterised by ‘special sensitivity’ and
understanding which would recognise and attend to the importance of eth-
nocultural diversity—a diversity that is inseparable from the character of
the Canadian political community. Finding bias in the notes meant that
such a flaw or error tainted the entire process through which the final dis-
cretionary decision was made, ultimately by a superior in the department.
The initial attitude, not corrected through the internal process, indicated
that the approach taken was unreasonable as it was ‘completely dismissive’
of the children’s interests and failed to give these interests ‘serious weight.’21
Notwithstanding the deference generally shown to discretionary decisions
of this kind, these reasons were held to be inconsistent with the values
underlying the grant of discretion—Canadian values which include respect
118 Mary Liston
16 Ibid at para 22. See also para 28.
17 As Rand J wrote in Roncarelli, in public administration there can be ‘no such thing as
absolute and untrammelled “discretion”, that is that action can be taken on any ground or for
any reasons that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator.’ Furthermore, no legisla-
tive Act can ‘without express language, be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power
exercised for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature and the
purpose of the statute’ or the rule of law. Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121 at para 19.
18 I borrow this term from Charles Taylor’s essay ‘What’s wrong with negative liberty’. In
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1985) 211–229 at 228. The Canadian landscape has a co-ordinate system of
second-guessing at the constitutional level since Courts and Parliament are allowed to trump
each other respectively through constitutional remedies and a constitutionally-guaranteed legisla-
tive override of judicial decisions (s 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
19 Second-guessing in the administrative context can happen internally within agencies or
externally through judicial review.
20 Baker, n 1 at para 48. This requirement links up with an earlier judgment, RDS, discussed
in notes 37–39 below in subsection 1 of s III.
21 Ibid at para 65.
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for diversity, family and children’s rights and interests—and therefore did
not meet the threshold of reasonableness which could command ‘respect’
from judicial review.22
L’Heureux-Dubé J’s judgment canvassed several interpretive aids such as
the purposes of the Immigration Act, international law,23 and the Minister’s
own guidelines. However, consideration of the ministerial guidelines 
provides the ethical moment and it is at this point in the judgment that 
the introductory quote can be located.24 The ministerial guidelines 
affirm the kind of treatment persons affected by the immigration regime
can legitimately expect from officers in the department—they represent, 
in a very loose sense, a code of conduct. The guidelines also embody 
one aspect of the character of the Canadian political community which 
is manifested through political commitments to diversity, fairness 
and good administration. The ‘manner’ in which the decision was 
made contradicted all of these commitments, summed up as ‘humanitarian
and compassionate values,’ and therefore the decision stepped outside 
the boundaries of reasonableness.25 In the Baker context, unreasonableness
and dismissiveness in manner were originally signalled by the lack of 
reasons given to Baker and her counsel, a defect and a disrespect 
that the court’s imposition of the duty to give reasons intended to 
remedy.
From Baker, it seems clear that reason-giving is valuable since such a
practice may assist in determining when reviewable error exists. However
reasons not only facilitate ‘second-guessing’ but also actualise several tenets
of the rule of law in context.26 Reason-giving may assist in ensuring fair
and transparent decision-making as well as contribute to the guarantee of
accuracy and accountability of decisions.27 Reasons can satisfy the maxim
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22 Ibid quoting Dyzenhaus’s notion of deference as respect. On Canadian values, see para 67. 
23 It is this aspect of the judgment where the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights were used that animated the dissent. Iacobucci and
Cory JJ dissented on the use of the executively-ratified but domestically unincorporated inter-
national documents which they held to be merely of interpretive guidance in an administrative
law decision. They stated that they felt the majority had violated the separation of powers doc-
trine through ‘backdoor’ incorporation via statutory interpretation. Without incorporation,
and outside of the Charter which invites consideration of international law as influential
authority since its bears such kinship with these kind of international documents, the
Convention was rendered ‘irrelevant’ (at para 81) by the dissent for administrative law even in
these circumstances. Ibid at paras 78–81.
24 For an important discussion of the usefulness of such ‘soft law’ in the process of justifica-
tion, see Lorne Sossin in this volume as well as L Sossin and CW Smith, ‘Hard Choices and
Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating
Government’ (2002) 40(4) Alberta Law Review 1–25.
25 Baker, n 1 at para 74.
26 I say the rule of law in context for, eg, transparency and consistency alone have no certain
connection with either democratic legitimacy or a culture of justification since a totalitarian or
authoritarian state can make ‘mad’ transparent rules consistently.
27 Baker, n 1 at paras 35–39. On the importance of reasons, see generally: PP Craig, ‘The
Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice’ (1994) 53 Cambridge Law Journal
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that justice is done and must be seen to be done and contribute to overall
legitimacy through recognition by the claimant that a negative result is nev-
ertheless fair and reasonable. Finally, reasons attend to the dignity interests
that are at the heart of post-World War II jurisprudence, as decisions which
have profound importance compel a requirement of reasons: ‘It would be
unfair for a person subject to a decision such as this one which is so critical
to their future not to be told why the result was reached.’28 Within the
framework I have proposed, then, reasons are essential for the realisation
of the rule of law within a democracy and, furthermore, serve as a particu-
lar instantiation of the rule of law. The duty to give reasons, then, has both
procedural and substantive value.
FROM SKELETAL TO FULL-BODIED: 
A LIVING, BREATHING BAKER?
In this section, I will examine a selection of pre- and post-Baker jurispru-
dence in order to illustrate this ethos in jurisprudential action. First, I will
very briefly allude to earlier jurisprudential links to the Baker approach, a
background I argue provides a bridge from Baker to important subsequent
caselaw. Three trajectories will then be plotted: the elaboration of the com-
mon law duty to give reasons (Sheppard); consideration of the proper atti-
tude intrinsic to judgement (Legault) as well as the resultant quality of the
given reasons (Hawthorne); and, the nexus between reasons, standards of
behaviour involving promises, and the remedies available for holding pub-
lic actors to account (Mount Sinai).
1. Anticipating Baker: Embryonic Manifestations
Though each of the terms, ‘alive’, ‘alert’ and ‘sensitive’ have appeared indi-
vidually in a multitude of judgments as predicates of a proper judicial men-
tality and indicators of good judgment, Baker is the case that brings them
all together methodologically and metaphorically. What this earlier caselaw
discloses is a web of related concepts, including: vulnerability within rights
to autonomy or self-determination, consent and trust, disclosure and 
context, deference and expertise, and equity and consistency. They suggest
that the essence of judgement is to be alive, alert and sensitive and that 
deference, instead acting as a cover for formalism or non-justiciability, at
heart means respect for human dignity and respect for the rule of law.
120 Mary Liston
282–302 at 283–84. For the Canadian context, see D Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto,
Irwin Law, 2001) at 306–18.
28 Ibid at para 43.
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Alertness in the administrative law context originates from Dickson J’s
(as he then was) notable dictum from CUPE, a case that, along with
Nicholson,29 changed the face of Canadian administrative law. In CUPE,
after considering the historical and political relationship between the courts
and labour tribunals in Canada, Dickson J concluded that:
[t]he question of what is and is not jurisdictional is often very difficult to
determine. The courts, in my view, should not be alert to brand as jurisdic-
tional, and therefore subject to broader curial review, that which may be
doubtfully so.30
Sensitivity to context was deemed paramount, meaning that the court
would not upset the delicate political balance that had been achieved in
Canadian labour relations—this disposition was captured in Dickson J’s
phrase that the labour board was ‘entitled to “err”’31 based on its compar-
ative expertise and this created the foundation for the evolution of the prag-
matic and functional approach in administrative law.32
CUPE discloses one aspect of the methodological approach which Baker
unifies: institutionalised practices of deference as respect. Outside of adminis-
trative law, criminal law illustrates the necessity of being alive and attentive
to complex issues in conflicted evidentiary contexts.33 And, as we will see
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29Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional) Police Commissioners [1979] 1 SCR 311. In addi-
tion to entrenching the duty to act fairly in Canadian administrative law, Nicholson dispensed
with formalism in another guise as it found that ‘at pleasure’ dismissals were ‘relics of Crown
law’ since there was more than one interest at play than the designated authority and such
authority, despite its executive-like authority, needed to conform to procedural justice when dis-
missing an employee by providing a fair opportunity to be heard. Nicholson at para 15.
30 Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corp [1979] 
2 SCR 227 at para 10.
31 Ibid at para 15. Though subsequent case law had to work through the legal tension between
agency protection through statutory privative clauses, being entitled to err, and when interven-
tion was necessary to correct error or to protect substantive interests that had been overridden.
32 This form of analysis was introduced in UES, Local 298 v Bibeault [1988] 2 SCR 1048.
33 See, eg: R v Esau [1997] 2 SCR 777 [hereinafter Esau]. The accused, a second-cousin of the
complainant, had sexual intercourse with her after a party at her home. She was drunk and
denied that she consented, saying that she had no memory of anything from the time she went
to her bedroom until the next morning. She testified that she would never have had sex with a
relative. The legal focus was on whether the trial judge erred in not putting the defence of 
mistaken belief about the complainant’s consent to the jury because he held that there was no
evidentiary basis for this defence. The appeal court found that the trial judge was correctly
‘alive’ to the issues raised by evidence. The Supreme Court divided along gender lines with the
five male justices finding sufficient evidence to justify the defence while the two female justices
dissented on the ground that there did not exist an ‘air of reality’ to the defence. McLachlin
and L’Heureux- Dubé JJ’s dissent demanded clear communication and explicit, not implied,
consent and shifted the focus to the mens rea of the accused on whom the evidentiary burden
rested. Increasingly, the accused must provide a good reason for his mistaken belief and show
that he has taken reasonable steps to request and obtain actual consent from the complainant.
The dissent’s approach has since emerged as the standard. As an analogue for old-style 
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below in the discussion of Sheppard, institutional parallels exist between
deference as respect in administrative law between reviewers and decision-
makers and in criminal law where deference as respect requires the review-
ing court to defer to the competence of trial court judges’ findings of fact in
complex criminal cases. Being attentive to the autonomy and vulnerability
of parties in power-dependent relations constitutes a third aspect of the
Baker approach and the ethos here can be summarised as being alert, alive
and sensitive to abuses of power.34 As an analogue to administrative law,
for example, the citizen’s position in the citizen-state relationship35 can mir-
ror that of the vulnerable party in tort law cases involving fiduciary 
relations.36 Finally, cases concerning the importance of justificatory prac-
tices or reason-giving and impartial judging in the judicial context 
can inform what it means to have an ‘open mind’ and, conversely bias in
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administrative law, the mistaken belief defence can sanction the discretionary judgement of the
accused, shifts the burden of proof onto the injured party, conceives of consent thinly and 
formally instead of as an on-going relational matter which can be revoked at any time, and
may allow the accused to circumvent the provision of a good reason for his mistaken belief. As
such, this defence should be as rare as untrammelled executive discretion in the new-style
administrative law context.
34 See, eg: Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226 at 228. This case hinged on consent and sex-
ual conduct but this time within the context of a doctor-patient relationship. Here a doctor
provided drugs to a drug-dependent woman in exchange for sex and, like Esau, the case
revolved around whether the patient had consented to this arrangement and in what manner
the doctor may have violated his duties by initiating and continuing to conduct this relation-
ship. Grounds for liability included the tort of battery, breach of contract and breach of a fidu-
ciary duty. As with sexual assault cases in the criminal context, a pragmatic and functional
methodology is used to recognise individual autonomy and free will within the analysis of con-
texts involving ‘power dependency’ relationships where the distribution of power is unequal
and one of the parties, as a result, is placed in a vulnerable position. The majority decided on
the grounds of battery and used an equitably-derived community standards approach to find
the doctor’s conduct exploitative. Sopinka J located the liability in contract but, despite his
finding of consent, concluded that the doctor’s conduct was a contractual breach. L’Heureux-
Dubé and McLachlin JJ’s concurring judgment rested on breach of fiduciary duty. On their
analysis, the foundation of the fiduciary obligation in the doctor-patient relationship is based
on trust and this shifts the focus to the risks involved in the unequal distribution of power
(notably power over another that is not inherently wrong), the rights and duties involved, and
when an abuse of power has taken place.
35 For recent work on the concept of public authority as a form of public political trust, see 
L Sossin, ‘Public Fiduciary Obligations, Political Trusts and the Evolving Duty of Reasonableness
in Administrative Law’ (2003) 66 Saskatchewan Law Review 101–55. My own take, which
accords with the equitable and justificatory approach taken by Sossin, is that in contrast to the
unilateral nature of the fiduciary relationship, I would instead construct an analogous rela-
tionship which de-emphasises vulnerability and re-emphasises a code of behaviour whose
authoritative source lies in the extra-legal power vested in judging citizens.
36 Similar problems regarding autonomy, trust and consent carry over into public law where the
courts have been loath to characterise the citizen-state relationship as fiduciary in nature.
Canadian jurisprudence, with the notable exception of the fiduciary duty the Crown holds
towards Aboriginal peoples, does not characterise the relationship between the state and its cit-
izens in terms of trust and consent per se though an analogous framework, I claim, necessarily
underpins any substantive conception of the basis of the political relationship between the state
and the citizen and the circumscribed nature of political power in a liberal democracy.
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decision-making contexts.37 As discussed above, Officer Lorenz in Baker
failed to appreciate Mavis Baker’s circumstances by exhibiting a great
degree of callousness in his notes. Moreover, he had inappropriately
‘crossed the line’ and made inappropriate use of the context to reach his
conclusion; he had therefore unduly restricted his discretionary ambit. His
judgement therefore manifested neither a ‘conscious, contextual inquiry’38
nor an open mind.39
2. Reason-giving, or ‘Sharing-the-World-with-Others’40
The pre-Baker caselaw discloses several bases of the methodological
approach which Baker unified including: contextualised and impartial judg-
ing, institutionalised practices of deference as respect, attention to the
autonomy and vulnerability of parties in power-dependent relations, and
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37 See, eg: R v RDS [1997] 23 SCR 484 [hereinafter RDS]. In this case, a white police officer
arrested RDS, an African-Canadian 15-year-old who had allegedly interfered with the arrest of
another youth. The police officer and RDS were the only witnesses and their accounts of the
events greatly differed from the other’s. The Youth Court Judge, while delivering her oral rea-
sons, responded to a rhetorical question put to her by the Crown—specifically, that there was
no reason to question the credibility of the officer—by saying that police officers in Halifax
had been known to mislead the court in the past and that they had been known to overreact
particularly toward non-white groups. The trial judge therefore concluded that she was more
likely to find the youth’s version credible. All of the Supreme Court justices in RDS agreed that
judges can at times make reference to prevailing social realities—such as the existence of
racism in a particular community—as any reasonable person would. Judges, therefore, are not
‘neutral ciphers.’ Not only can judges not discount their life experiences, they ought not to
according to the Supreme Court so long as these conclusions have been tested in the reasoning
process. Ibid at para 38. Using the test for apprehension of bias discussed above in subsection
1c of s II, the majority concluded that judges should avoid making untested generalisations
and here the judge’s comments were ‘close to the line’ but acceptable. The dissent (Lamer CJ,
Sopinka and Major JJ), however, found that the judge’s comments were stereotypical concern-
ing police offices and constituted an irreparable defect.
38 Ibid at para 42. But, in contrast to RDS where much effort was devoted to inquiring into
and evaluating the social context of Sparks J’s judgment, the Baker court did not spend much
time at all considering the social context of Officer Lorenz’s notes. This would seem an impor-
tant omission when determining reasonable apprehension of bias in context.
39 McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ (La Forest and Gonthier JJ concurring) approached the
reasonable apprehension of bias test differently than the majority did and found that the
judge’s remarks were an ‘entirely appropriate recognition of the facts … and of the context.’
The two justices provided a different characterisation of impartial judgment, suggesting that
having an ‘open mind’ or the capacity for an ‘enlargement of mind’ is the essential precondi-
tion since it functions as a species of representative thinking which considers a multiplicity of
standpoints about a certain issue. Ibid at paras 42–44 quoting J Nedelsky, ‘Embodied Diversity
and the Challenges to Law’ (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal 91. Consequently, the judge’s per-
sonal understanding of the factual and social context indicated that she was alive and alert to
the context. Ibid at paras 57–59.
40 This phrase originates with Hannah Arendt and her thoughts on the Kantian activity of
judging in her essay ‘The Crisis in Culture’ in Between Past and Future (New York, Penguin,
1977) 173–226 at 221. See also ‘Truth and Politics’ 227–64. Arendt’s work indirectly consti-
tuted a crucial source for the conception of impartial judgement in RDS as it was significantly
relied on by Nedelsky in an article cited by the court in n 39.
C h a p - 0 5 . q x d   1 6 / 0 9 / 0 3   5 : 2 0  P M   P a g e  1 2 3
the importance of justificatory practices or reason-giving. The addition of
the duty to give reasons to the content of the duty to act fairly, however,
constitutes the crucial advance in Canadian administrative law brought
about by Baker. Though the duty to give reasons is not yet a general duty
imposed on all statutory and prerogative authorities in Canada, I will argue
that reading Baker in conjunction with the explication of a duty to give rea-
sons in the criminal case Sheppard,41 provides fruitful elaboration on the
duty to give reasons in the administrative law context. Most importantly,
Sheppard concerns a case where the reasons given by a trial judge failed to
meet the obligation.42 Using the Baker ethos of alert, alive and sensitive, 
I will show how the Sheppard decision gives greater specificity to the con-
tent of the duty to give reasons.
(A) The Bare Bones of Sheppard
The facts behind Sheppard involve an accused, Colin Sheppard, whose at
times violent ex-girlfriend, Sandra Noseworthy, vowed to ‘get him’ after
the break-up of their tempestuous relationship. She informed the police that
he had confessed to her that he had stolen two windows for his home reno-
vation, windows which were later discovered to have disappeared from a
supplier’s stock. No other evidence, verbal or physical, linked the accused
to these missing windows; he had no prior criminal record or charges.
Barnable J, the trial court judge, found the accused guilty based on the evi-
dence and on the testimony of credible witnesses, including the ex-girlfriend
as chief informant. His judgment, in its entirety, read:
‘Having considered all the testimony in this case, and reminding myself of the
burden on the Crown and the credibility of witnesses, and how this is to be
assessed, I find the defendant guilty as charged.’43
According to the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland, Barnable J’s failure to
provide reasons compelled intervention because he did not indicate that he
was ‘alive’ to the issues and to let the judgment stand would ‘encourage
trial judges to deliberately structure judgments to frustrate appellate review
or to mask a lazy or inadequate analysis.’44 The Supreme Court agreed with
the Court of Appeal and provided a detailed framework outlining the
requirement of reasons, the propositions of which will be outlined below.
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41 R v Sheppard [2002] SCJ No 30, 2002 SCC 26 [hereinafter Sheppard]. Note that this judg-
ment did not include Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé. 
42 For a significant early article concerning civil, not criminal, cases, see M Taggart, ‘Should
Canadian Judges be Legally Required to Give Reasoned Decisions in Civil Cases?’ (1983) 33
University of Toronto Law Journal 1.
43 Sheppard, n 41 at para 10.
44 Ibid at paras 11–12.
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(B) Was the Reason-giver Alert and Attentive?
Binnie J for the court in Sheppard considered that attentiveness to the 
context and the interests ensures some direction for the judicial mind about
how the duty to give reasons ought to be fulfilled. Where it is plain why an
accused has been acquitted or accused on the evidence, and where inade-
quate or absent reasons will not hinder the exercise of the right of appeal,
the Supreme Court suggested that intervention with respect to reasons will
not be required. However, where reasoning is murky or confused, where
evidence is conflicting, where a variety of interpretations about the judge’s
reasons can be drawn, and where difficult areas of law were ‘circumnavi-
gated without explanation’ 45 by the trial court judge, some or all of which
might hinder appellate review, then deficiencies in reasons may be held an
error of law.
Binnie J offered a ten-point framework outlining the duty of a trial judge
to give reasons in the context of appellate intervention in a criminal 
case.46 Briefly, he found that reasons satisfy demands for accountability,
certainty and due process and that a decision which meets these demands
provides assurance about the integrity of the appellate process. Reasons
serve the purpose for the imposed duty within the particular context 
so that not every deficiency will provide a ground of appeal.47 Reasons 
will also not be held to an abstract standard of perfection. However, 
judges are not infallible and especially in instances of unsettled law or 
evidentiary uncertainty, the presumption of competence is limited and 
justifies the role of appellate courts to ‘cure’ unintelligibility through 
substitution.
Significantly, Binnie J rejected ‘floodgates’ or efficiency-based arguments
which suggest the duty to provide reasons significantly slows down the
criminal justice system and imposes an onerous task on already overworked
lower court judges. The response to this point was that if judges were alert
during the trial process, then constructing reasons would not be so heavy 
a burden and therefore the arguments for reasons outweigh efficiency 
concerns:
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45 Ibid at para 46.
46 Ibid at para 55.
47 On this point, see R v Zinck [2003] SCJ No 5, 2003 SCC 6. The Supreme Court reviewed a
trial judge’s decisions to delay parole eligibility—a decision characterised as ‘out of the ordi-
nary’ (at para 29)—and found that they did not breach the Sheppard standard despite being
somewhat imprecise and curtailed. In contrast to Baker, though delayed parole is an extraor-
dinary measure, the context did not require additional procedures apart from the sentencing
decision and therefore the accused did not need any written notice that delayed parole would
be applied for by the Crown. The offender, however, must be allowed to make submissions
and introduce additional evidence in response, and is entitled to reasons (at paras 36–37). The
court held that though a more detailed analysis ‘should have been attempted,’ the reasons read
in context with the evidence and submissions made at the hearing, permitted an appellate
court to understand and review the decision (at para 39).
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While, as suggested above, the act of formulating reasons may further focus
and concentrate the judge’s mind, and demands an additional effort of self-
expression, the requirement of reasons as such is directed only to having the
trial judge articulate the thinking process that it is presumed has already
occurred in a fashion sufficient to satisfy the demand of appellate review.48
The Supreme Court concluded that where deficient reasons implicate fun-
damental principles which protect the interests, rights and privileges of a
citizen, and which prevent the appellate court from being satisfied that fun-
damental principles have been properly applied, then deficiency of reasons
may be converted into an error of law in the criminal context49—a proposi-
tion which I argue ought to extend to the administrative context. There
exists, then, a ‘necessary connection’ between the failure to provide proper
reasons and the frustration of rights of appeal in the appellate context
rather than a more general duty to give reasons with a free-standing right
of appeal.50 Rights, however, must not be rendered ‘illusory’ or unexercis-
able which would make a sham of the system of justice within courts and,
as I argue, within internal agency review.51
(C) Was the Reason-giver Alive to the Issues?
Barnable J in Sheppard erred in law by not providing sufficiently intelligible
or adequate reasons in circumstances which ‘cried out for some explana-
tory analysis’ thereby substantially impeding appellate review.52 Though
the Supreme Court stated that no general duty to give reasons rests on the
trial judge ‘in the abstract and divorced from the circumstances of the par-
ticular case,’ nevertheless at the ‘broadest level of accountability, the giving
of reasoned judgments is central to the legitimacy of judicial institutions in
the eyes of the public.’53 Accordingly, reasons facilitate public scrutiny of
the evolving law in order to arrive at agreement or criticism about the rules
of conduct applicable to their activities. Furthermore, if no reasons are
given in the judicial context, judges are prevented from judging the judges—
a violation of a ‘broad principle of governance’ which translates into a spe-
cific rule concerning appellate review.54 The trial judge’s one sentence
‘skeletal’ judgment, however, provided no toehold for review and was
therefore unreasonable—to draw out the metaphor, both the legal body
and mind were ‘dead’ and all that remained as evidence of a live process
were reasons as vital as a pile of bones.
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48 Sheppard, n 41 at para 51.
49 Ibid at para 43.
50 Ibid at para 53.
51 Ibid at para 66.
52 Ibid at para 1.
53 Ibid at paras 4–5.
54 Ibid at para 5.
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The starting point for the Supreme Court’s analysis was the proposition
that reasons are essential for judicial accountability because they are evi-
dence that justice has been done and has been seen to be done.55 For this
proposition, the Supreme Court cited Baker, though hedged that the form
and nature of the duty to give reasons conforms to each adjudicative setting
and therefore must be understood as a spectrum of possibilities rather than
one template.56 Reasons are evidence the judicial mind has ‘concentrated’
on the problems in the case and show the path that explains and justifies
the result.57 Thus, the test is contextual, functional and pragmatic and 
the question to be asked becomes: does this particular decision provide suf-
ficient reasoning or a rational basis to enable appellate review of the cor-
rectness of the decision? Any subsequent intervention is not based on the
aesthetics of poor articulation per se.
In contrast, the companion case to Sheppard, Braich58, also involved
contradictory evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Here, however, the
trial judge was ‘alive’ to one complexity—the possibility of collusion
between key witnesses—but after due and articulated consideration,
rejected this finding.59 The trial judge’s reasons were sufficient to meet 
the functional test of allowing the appeal court to review the correctness of
the trial decision60 and the Court chastised the appellate judge for holding
the trial judge to ‘an unjustifiably high standard of perfection.’61
The appellate court was not permitted to substitute its views for that of
the trial judge who provided an ‘intelligible pathway through his reasons.’62
In other words, the appellate court was not allowed to characterise the trial
court judge’s reasons as ‘inadequate’ in order to ‘mask’ what was, in effect,
a disagreement about the result.63 The institutional allocation of a decision
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55 Ibid at para 15.
56 They cite the following passage: ‘it is now appropriate to recognize that, in certain circum-
stances, the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for
a decision. The strong arguments demonstrating the advantages of written reasons suggest
that, in cases such as this where the decision has important significance for the individual,
when there is a statutory right of appeal, or in other circumstances, some form of reasons
should be required.’ See Baker, n 1 at para 43.
57 Sheppard, n 41 at paras 23–24.
58 R v Braich [2002] SCJ No 29, 2002 SCC 27.
59 Ibid at para 26.
60 In an interesting aside, Binnie J writing for the Court observed that the appellate judge,
McEachern CJ who found the trial judge’s reasons deficient, himself engaged in skimpy rea-
soning when McEachern CJ thought certain applicable law was so well-known and superflu-
ous that he did not propose to discuss it. Binnie J commented: ‘As the Court of Appeal thought
it superfluous to discuss the applicable law, it was prepared to extend the same dispensation to
the trial judge.’ Ibid at para 33.
61 Ibid at para 37.
62 Ibid at para 42.
63 Ibid at para 39. Binnie J suggests that the appellate court was driven by the peculiarities of
the facts rather than the deficiency of the reasons: ‘The majority judgment simply took the
view that if the trial judge had thought harder about the problems and written a more exten-
sive analysis, he might have reached a different conclusion’. Ibid at para 41. 
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about credibility that rests on findings of fact belongs to the trial 
court judge. As an analogue to administrative law, then, agencies and 
tribunals which exhibit competence in analysis and come to reasonable 
conclusions based on their understanding of the facts and context should
be accorded the same measure of respect as a trial court judge is by a
reviewing court. A similar scope of deference is accorded to a decision-
maker’s judgement of what the policy context requires in a particular 
matter.
(D) Was the Reason-giver Sensitive to the Context?
Barnable J’s ‘generic’ reasons could ‘apply with equal facility to almost any
criminal case,’ a result which not only indicates a lack of reasoning but a
lack of respect for the particularity of the case before him and therefore he
showed disrespect to the particular accused who appeared before him.64
His reasons were so ‘“generic” as to be no reasons at all’ and provided no
‘comfort’ to the losing party concerning the fairness of the process.65
However, brevity and efficiency in reason-giving were not held to be syn-
onymous with bad reasons and the onus still remained on the appellant to
show that a prejudicial deficiency in reasons impeded access to appellate
review in the criminal context. While absent or inadequate reasons might
support a conclusion of unreasonableness, that alone will not constitute a
reviewable ground. Where law is unsettled, however, it would be ‘wise’—
albeit not obligatory—for a trial judge to provide reasons setting out the
legal principles;66 silence on settled points is acceptable but the absence of
reasons in general was not ‘blessed.’67
Looking at Barnable J’s decision, the Supreme Court admonished him
for solipsistically ‘reminding himself’ of his reasoning without articulating
the ‘pathway’ he had taken.68 He failed to appreciate, perhaps even 
completely disregarded, the public nature of his obligation to three 
audiences: the accused, the appellate court and the general public. He 
also failed to provide ‘clarity, transparency and accessibility’ to intelligible
reasoning and in so doing frustrated the contextualisation of the rule 
of law.69
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64 Sheppard, n 41 at para 32.
65 On this point, Binnie J quoted Green JA from the appellate level Sheppard decision:
‘Particularly in a difficult case where hard choices have to be made, [reasons] may provide a
modicum of comfort, especially to the losing party, that the process operated fairly … It is cold
comfort … to an accused seeking an explanation for being convicted in a case where there was
realistic chance of success, to be told he is not entitled to an explanation because judges are
“too busy”.’ Ibid at para 60.
66 Ibid at para 40.
67 Ibid at para 37.
68 Ibid at paras 59, 61.
69 Ibid at para 63.
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3. Sensitivity, or Reminding the Head about the Heart
After the Baker decision was handed down, a backlash from the bench
occurred based on the belief that this judgment warranted too much judi-
cial intervention into discretionary decision-making and therefore disturbed
the Canadian version of the separation of powers.70 A Federal Court 
of Appeal case of just such a backlash, Legault, focused on how decision-
making ought to consider the children’s best interests and whether these
interests ‘trumped’ or took precedence over all other considerations in
humanitarian and compassionate grounds applications.71 Décary JA found
the trial court judge’s reading of Baker ‘excessive.’72
Looking to Suresh73 and Chieu,74 both of which ‘clarified’ Baker in 
light of this ambiguity, the appellate court affirmed that the weighing of 
relevant factors is the responsibility of the Minister or the Minister’s 
delegate, not the court’s responsibility. Procedural fairness in these circum-
stances does not dictate a particular outcome but includes the right to make
written submissions to the immigration officer who actually makes the 
decision, a right to an unbiased decision-maker and a right to receive 
brief reasons for the decision. However, the officer must still illustrate 
that she is ‘alert, alive and sensitive’ to the various factors including 
the children’s interests, but once she has identified and considered the 
facts, it is her judgement which then determines the weight accorded 
to each factor;75 importantly, ‘mere mention’ of the children is not 
sufficient evidence of considered examination and weighing.76 Here the
immigration officer was found to have ‘examined the interests of the 
children with a great deal of attention’ and these were weighed against
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70 See n 23 and accompanying text.
71 Legault v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 4 FC 358, FCJ No 457,
FCA 125 (CA) [hereinafter Legault]. The individual was an American citizen and had been liv-
ing in Canada for 20 years. He had two families in Canada—7 children by 2 ex-wives—and
was the sole supporter of these families. He was indicted on a number of fraud-related offences
and, after negative results to applications to stay based on permanent residence and refugee
status, filed a humanitarian and compassionate grounds application which was also denied.
72 Nadon J in the trial decision wrote: ‘In conclusion, it is my view that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Baker … calls for a certain result, and that result is that, save in exceptional cases,
the children’s best interests must prevail. … As I have made it clear, I do not share the view
expressed by the Supreme Court’ Legault v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
[2001] FCJ No 568, 2001 FCT 315 (FCTD) at paras 67–68.
73 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] SCJ No 3, 2002 SCC 1
at paras 35–38: ‘If the Minister has considered the appropriate factors in conformity with
these constraints, the court must uphold her decision. It cannot set it aside even if it would
have weighted the factors differently and arrived at a different conclusion’(at para 38).
74 Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] SCJ No 1, 2002 SCC 3 at
para 70 where the Supreme Court declared that Baker stands as ‘an example of an instance
where the Minister’s decision was procedurally deficient’ rather than entailing any substantive
considerations.
75 Legault, n 71 at para 12.
76 Ibid at para 13. 
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other factors in a reasonable decision. The Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal.77
In Hawthorne,78 the ‘best interests of the child’ factor received greater
articulation than the discussion in Legault. The baseline that the Federal
Court of Appeal found was ‘absent exceptional circumstances … the
“child’s best interests” factor will play in favour of the non-removal of the 
parent.’79 In the majority and concurring judgements, the court held that
the immigration officer was not ‘alert, alive and sensitive’ to the child’s
interests—a child who had permanent resident status—because the officer
subsumed these particular interests under the separate category of inquiry
around the hardship of removal of the parent on the child.80 Moreover, the
officer, in the written reasons to Ms Hawthorne outlining why her applica-
tion was denied, clearly appeared quite heartless about the child’s concerns
which were provided to the officer by Suzette in a formal statement.
The concurring decision by Evans JA elucidated the broader and explic-
itly normative perspective and provided guidance on how to interpret the
degree of harm in this particular context.81 He too found that the officer
provided insufficient treatment of the child’s interests, writing: ‘The sum-
mary, or less than responsive, treatment of the principal submissions made
to the officer is indicative or a dismissive attitude towards her best inter-
ests.’82 And, importantly, although he noted that properly formulated rea-
sons which ‘clearly demonstrate that the best interests of an affected child
have received careful attention’ no doubt impose an administrative burden,
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77 Legault v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] SCCA No 220—no
reasons given. 
78 Hawthorne v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] FCJ No 1687, 2002
FCA 475 (CA). Daphney Hawthorne left Jamaica to live with the father of her daughter
Suzette in 1992. Ms Hawthorne and the father of Suzette had separated in 1994 after he
abused her; he subsequently married another woman and had children. Suzette, the daughter,
remained in Jamaica with her grandmothers until her father sponsored her in 1999; her mother
sent her financial assistance throughout this period. After coming to Canada, Suzette lived
with and was supported by her mother. Ms Hawthorne had no legal status in Canada and in
the midst of a humanitarian and compassionate grounds application to regularise her immi-
gration status, was ordered deported in 2000. At this time, Suzette was in her early teens, did
not want to live with her father as he was suspected of abusing one of his children, had no
other relatives in Canada, and was not old enough to live on her own.
79 Ibid at para 5 in the majority judgment by Décary and Rothstein JJA. 
80 Ibid at para 10.
81 For example, Evans JA took seriously the Immigration Manual guidelines, calling them the
‘normative framework’ within which humanitarian and compassionate grounds decisions are
made. Ibid at para 30. Evans JA’s position on such ‘soft law’ accords with and supports that
taken by Sossin and Smith: ‘As cases such as Baker … illustrate, although courts have often
been unwilling to treat guidelines and codes as law, soft law has significant potential to serve
as a conduit for a judicial-executive dialogue concerning the nature and scope of bureaucratic
decision-making.’ See Sossin and Smith, n 24 at 24.
82 Ibid at para 50. Evans JA stated that the immigration officer had failed to treat Suzette’s
interests properly because an incorrect comparison was made. The relevant comparison ought
to have been Suzette’s present life in Canada and the choice of either losing her mother or her
residency, not what her life would be like in Jamaica if she ‘opted’ to leave with her mother. 
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this is as it should be. Rigorous process requirements are fully justified for 
the determination of subsection 114(2) applications that may adversely affect
the welfare of children with the right to reside in Canada: vital interests of the
vulnerable are at stake and opportunities for substantive review are limited.83
Left for another day was the question of whether post-Baker cases like
Suresh in fact preclude inquiry into the substantive unreasonableness84 of
the exercise of discretion when important individual interests are unreason-
ably or capriciously harmed—that is, interests that are either non-Charter
or outside of traditional ultra vires categories.
4. Promises, or Footing the Remedy
The Mount Sinai hospital case provides a fascinating example of the murky
line between the scope of discretion and the finality of a decision.85 At 
play in this decision, were a wide variety of unusual factors including the
inconsistent behaviour of a government official, an overt promise, judicial
reconstruction of the public interest and a contextualised approach to the
determination of an ongoing web of relationships—the combination of
which led to a rare instance of mandamus as a remedy to compel issuance
of an operating permit from the Crown.
Of the two judgments, judgments which agree regarding the result but
not in the method, the minority judgment written by Binnie J with the con-
currence of McLachlin CJ evokes the language of Baker.86 This judgment
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83 Ibid at para 52.
84 Evans JA suggested that ‘[d]iscretion is exercised unreasonably or capriciously when the
damage to important individual interests is disproportionate to the benefit produced by the
decision.’ Ibid at para 35. 
85 Mount Sinai Hospital Center v Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services) [2001] SCJ
No 43, 2001 SCC 41 [hereinafter Mount Sinai]. Since the 1950s, Mount Sinai hospital had
possessed an operating permit which did not reflect its mix of long-term and short-term facili-
ties, a situation known to the provincial government all along. In the 1980s, Mount Sinai and
the government began negotiations to move the Center to Montreal and the Minister promised
the Center that it would alter the permit to reflect reality upon the move, a promise which was
reaffirmed on many occasions. In 1991, the Center moved and applied to have its permit regu-
larised but, without giving the Center an opportunity to respond, the Minister retracted the
promise and said the Center would have to operate under the terms of the old permit. 
86 In contrast, the majority judgment written by Bastarache J found a particular ‘moment’
where the Minister had exercised his discretion—the 1991 move. This meant that the Minster’s
discretion was not under review, as in Baker and in Binnie J’s judgment, because it was ‘spent’
in January 1991. In October the Center received a letter revoking the promise and reversing
the discretion and the question became whether this decision constituted a valid reversal. In
light of the Minister’s subsequent inconsistent behaviour with this supposed reversal,
Bastarache J found that a later letter was an invalid exercise of discretion: ‘The Minister can-
not promise the Center to issue the modified permit when the move to Montreal is made,
refuse to issue that permit, and then continue to treat the Center as if the permit had in fact
been issued.’ Ibid at para 114. 
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also illustrates an interesting nexus between public and private law in
understanding a ‘web of understandings and incremental agreements’ on
which the Center relied and which, over time, came to embody a specific
public interest.87 Binnie J reviewed the various grounds of appeal (eg, an
acquired right, failure to observe procedural fairness, legitimate expecta-
tions, public promissory estoppel, and abuse of discretion) and considered
failure to observe procedural fairness and abuse of discretion (citing Baker)
as the appropriate grounds to find the Minister’s decision patently unrea-
sonable.88 On this standard, the Minister showed a ‘total lack of regard for
the implications for the respondents of the Minister’s broken promises’ and
the court was unable to mitigate this finding since the Minister offered no
‘serious policy reason’ for a redefinition of the public interest.89 Indeed, the
court suggested that it would have been ‘sensitive’ to any serious policy rea-
son the Minister might have put forward.90 As a result, 10 years after the
broken promise and without any supporting reasons, the Minister was not
allowed to advance a new vision of the public interest and the only option
left open to him was to issue the modified permit.91
What is particularly novel and encouraging about the Mount Sinai deci-
sion is that the court undertook a probing review of an executive decision
under the rubric of abuse of discretion and concluded that such an abuse
demands a very intrusive remedy. But, as with Baker, the evidentiary
requirements—the reasons—possess an air of contingency about them
which makes assertion of an ethos a tenuous and variable claim for, as
Binnie J states:
The communications from the Minister are not simply evidence of the state of
the Minister’s minds, but are the source of the respondents’ entitlement. In
other words, if the successive Ministers had gone through the same cogita-
tions and deliberations as they did between 1984 and 1991, but kept their
thoughts to themselves, I think it unlikely that the respondents would succeed
in obtaining the order they seek (emphasis added).92
In other words, if public officials keep their cogitations private and do not
provide any evidence of reasoning, then the duty to give reasons can be no
more than a sham.
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87 Ibid at para 8. Binnie J writes: ‘If this were a private law situation there would likely be a
breach of contract. This is not, of course, a private law situation.’
88 Unfortunately, this decision has set back the development of both legitimate expectations
and public law estoppel for some time in Canada.
89 Ibid at paras 64–65. Bastarache J also held that the ‘Minister cannot now invoke a vague
and ungrounded funding concern as a reason for reversing a prior exercise of discretion in
these circumstances.’ Ibid at para 109.
90 Ibid at para 65.
91 Ibid at para 67.
92 Ibid at para 4.
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SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAKER ETHOS FOR 
CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Binnie J’s statement directly above regarding the contingent evidentiary
foundation in the Mount Sinai case sounds a necessary cautionary note
about the potential sanguinity of my approach to Baker. In this section, 
I hope to flesh out the argument against the possibility that Baker can pro-
vide no purchase regarding the quality of the reason-giving exercise and
therefore may further a substandard relationship between the administra-
tive decision-maker and the affected individuals or citizens, particularly
vulnerable persons.93
1. Fleshing Out the Reasons Requirement
Critics of the duty to provide reasons usually warn that reasons may do
very little to facilitate the free and fair exchange of information in the
administrative setting. They may also do very little to produce accountabil-
ity, transparency, or legitimacy in either the administrative or judicial
spheres. Indeed, Lorne Sossin goes so far as to suggest that Baker may act
as a disincentive as decision-makers may perversely use reasons to circum-
vent judicial review of the decision.94 Cursory, formulaic, vague, unclear,
uninformative, inauthentic—’boilerplate’ or bureaucratic—reasons could
emerge as a standard and, in some administrative contexts, be held accept-
able by a reviewer based on functional grounds alone—that is to say, that a
lack of reasons would not frustrate review of the decision. Lastly, the
absence of reasons and the inadequacy of reasons are also not free-standing
grounds of appeal—in this respect both Baker and Sheppard represent the
failings of law for some.
Nevertheless, review for the reasonableness of decisions has expanded
and I suggest that the absence or inadequacy of reasons may no longer 
be acceptable.95 Fairness considerations could and should be used to 
challenge this outcome and I argue that where reasons are deficient and
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93 See, eg: L Sossin, ‘An Intimate Approach to Fairness, Impartiality and Reasonableness in
Administrative Law’ (2002) 27 Queen’s Law Journal 809–858. In his article, Sossin suggests
replacing the current fairness model with a proposed ‘framework of intimacy’ which conceives
of the exchange of knowledge as the basis for justifying decisions to the affected parties and the
public, not as the means to legitimating adverse decisions. Ibid at 826–27. Such a framework
would include a standard on which to assess and evaluate reasons in order to spur the produc-
tion of ‘fuller, clearer, more comprehensive, genuine reasons.’ Sossin, however, does not disclose
what this standard of meaningfulness looks like or how this it will operate. Ibid at 837–38.
94 As Sossin notes, fairness depends on the disclosure of knowledge by both parties where the
decision-maker is obliged to provide some information to the individual and the affected party
has the right to have certain information considered by the decision-maker. Ibid at 824 and 836.
95 On the desirability of a general duty of to give reasons at common law, see Craig, n 27 at
301–02.
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reveal an inattentive or arbitrary disposition, or where insupportable and
unsupported conclusions are drawn, such deficiencies will provide a justifi-
cation for greater scrutiny and a demand for reasons.
(A) Absent Reasons
Reading Baker through Sheppard tells us that not every administrative law
decision will attract the duty to give reasons nor in the same way. However,
where significant interests and rights are at play, it would be prudent public
policy for the decision-maker to provide an intelligible rationale in order to
satisfy the individual, the reviewer (either agency or judicial), and the gen-
eral public. Determining evidence and weighing relevant factors will, in
general, be the domain of the decision-maker who has first-hand knowl-
edge of the context.
The absence of reasons could evoke a continuum of responses on the
pragmatic and functional approach ranging from undeferential suspicion, to
a probing examination, to soliciting respectful attention from the reviewer,
and all the way to—though I would argue almost never—endorsement and
full deference. Mount Sinai, for example, provided an example where the
Supreme Court engaged in a respectful examination of the policy context
while Sheppard stood somewhere between undeferential suspicion and a
probing examination.
Outside of the criminal law context, the Montfort Hospital decision,
Lalonde,96 illustrates greater scrutiny of a discretionary decision. The
Ontario Court of Appeal in Lalonde reviewed a discretionary decision to
close the sole francophone hospital in Ontario, a decision purporting to be
made in the public interest. Looking to the context and approaching lan-
guage rights purposively in the pragmatic and functional approach,97 the
Ontario court identified several underlying constitutional principles and
used these principles to interpret the statutory boundaries within which the
Ontario government could act. Here the court used Baker for the proposi-
tion that the ‘the review of discretionary decisions on the basis of funda-
mental Canadian constitutional and societal values’ is possible and, despite
being accorded deference, are not immune.98 The statute required that a
134 Mary Liston
96 Lalonde v Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) [2001] OJ No
4767, 56 OR (3d) 505 (OCA) [hereinafter Lalonde]. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that
a fundamental unwritten principle of the constitutional order, protection of minorities, served
to protect Ontario’s sole francophone hospital from both closure and substantial reduction in
services. The Minister’s directions were quashed because they failed to take into account the
importance of francophone institutions and the preservation of the Franco-Ontarian culture.
97 Weiler and Sharpe JJA approvingly cite Supreme Court jurisprudence which states that lan-
guage rights ‘must be given a purposive interpretation, taking into account the historical and
social context, past injustices, and the importance of rights and institutions to the minority
language community affected.’ Ibid at para 138.
98 Ibid at para 177.
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right to receive French language services existed and could only be limited
if all reasonable and necessary measures to comply with the statute had
been exhausted. Montfort was explicitly designated as a francophone hos-
pital for the Ottawa-Carleton community and the decision to restructure
was a shift in policy for which no explanation was given. Given this
absence, the court was compelled to scrutinise the gap:
Although it is impossible to specify precisely what is encompassed by the
words ‘reasonable and necessary’ and ‘all reasonable measures,’ at a 
minimum they require some justification or explanation for the directions
limiting the rights of francophones to benefit from Montfort as a community
hospital.99
While the Minister could exercise discretion to change and even limit the
provision of these services, ‘it cannot simply invoke administrative conven-
ience and vague funding concerns as the reasons for doing so … .’100 The
Health Services Commission forfeited its entitlement to deference by pro-
viding no justificatory policy for impinging on fundamental constitutional
values and its decision would have been found, on any standard of review,
incorrect or unreasonable.101
(B) Inadequate Reasons
The adequacy of reasons is an area demanding greater jurisprudential elab-
oration as well. In the criminal case Braich discussed in subsection 2c of
part III, what remained unresolved was the on-going puzzle of when a lack
of genuine ‘hard thought’ on the part of the original decision-maker will
constitute an improper or unreasonable step in the margin of discretionary
manoeuvrability so that a reviewer can say with legitimacy and certainty
that a different conclusion ought to have been reached in the context of a
particular case. Whether such occurrences remain the exception remains to
be charted.
Gray v Ontario102 is a case that grapples with the fairness dimension of
reasons in an examination of the ‘quality’ of reasons in the statutory context.
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99 Ibid at para 166.
100 Ibid at 168. This language concerning the nature of the governmental justification strongly
echoes that found in the Mount Sinai case above. See n 89 above and text therein.
101 Ibid at 186.
102 Gray v Ontario (Disability Support Program, Director) [2002] OJ No 1531 (CA) [here-
inafter Gray]. The appellant claimed disability benefits on the basis that migraines and other
ailments precluded her from holding down any form of employment. The Social Benefits
Tribunal found that, although the appellant was credible in her testimony about her condition,
she could cope on a day-to-day basis, was not substantially impaired, and therefore was not a
person with a disability. It was unclear on what evidence the Tribunal relied in reaching this
conclusion.
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McMurtry CJO affirmed an earlier dictum that the duty to give reasons is
‘only fulfilled if the reasons provided are adequate … [and] serve the 
functions for which the duty to provide them was imposed.’103 The Ontario
Court of Appeal unanimously held that a decision-maker must set out find-
ings of fact as well as the principal evidence upon which the findings are
based—particularly when the statutory regime implicates vulnerable 
persons such as people with disabilities. Not only did the tribunal provide
‘little or no explanation of the reasoning process,’104 the tribunal asked
itself the wrong question.105 Mirroring Sheppard, Gray stands for the
proposition in the administrative context that when a tribunal ‘asks itself
the wrong question’ and fails to give reasons that are statutorily required,
both of these flaws will be considered a reviewable error of law—errors
which do not entitle a tribunal to deference.106
(C) Conclusions and Further Problems
Post-Baker caselaw suggests that the absence or inadequacy of reasons will
not serve as complete bars to a demand for justification. They point to a
baseline that where an important interest has been negatively affected by a
discretionary decision, justification is required.107 Indeed, caselaw suggests
that absence or inadequacy of reasons can inform grounds for review under
the duty of fairness and its contents. Finally, Baker and its progeny tell us
that a variety of authorities can be used to call the decision-maker to
account including international law, fundamental norms both written and
unwritten, and policy guidelines. Several problems, however, remain unre-
solved and I will mention a few here.
First, given the balance of power between the discretionary decision-
maker and the affected individual(s), and as Binnie J alluded to in Mount
Sinai, the element of contingency will almost certainly remain an eviden-
tiary challenge for administrative law cases. Second, save legislative amend-
ment or further judicial extension, these cases do not address the concern left
open by Baker that reasons need not be contemporaneous with the decision
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103 Ibid at para 22 quoting VIA Rail Canada Inc v Canada (National Transportation Agency)
[2001] 2 FC 25 (FCA).
104 Ibid at para 24.
105 The Court of Appeal stated that the question was not whether the appellant could cope on
a day-to-day basis but whether or not she could function in the workplace and the community
or attend to her personal care. Ibid at para 25.
106 Ibid at paras 25–26. This would suggest that the appropriate standard of review on these
issues, depending on the context, is correctness or reasonableness.
107 See R Macdonald and D Lametti, ‘Reasons for Decisions in Administrative Law’ (1990) 3
Canadian Journal of Law and Administrative Practice 123 at 151–58 and MH Morris,
‘Administrative Decision-makers and the Duty to Give Reasons: An Emerging Debate’ (1998)
11 Canadian Journal of Law and Administrative Practice 155 at 177–78.
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but may be obtained after the fact and upon request.108 Third, despite the
guidance provided by the pragmatic and functional approach, these cases
do not yet adequately address the problem of the appropriate standard of
review of substantively unreasonable discretionary decisions that different
decision-makers might reach.109 And fourth, the caselaw has not yet
resolved the underlying problem of when the courts will intervente in sub-
stantively unreasonable discretionary decisions and how they might remedy
such decisions. For different reasons, both Braich and Suresh suggest that
reweighing and resort to substantive remedies will occur infrequently.
Nevertheless, Baker, Sheppard, Mount Sinai, Lalonde, Hawthorne and
Gray together suggest that deference will not be granted to a public body if
it appears that not all the evidence was considered, if the court cannot
determine how or if fair decision-making was engaged, or if reasons are
sparse, incoherent and otherwise indefensible.110 And, it is clear that a vari-
ety of remedies exist including mandamus, which can be used to order the
issuance of reasons, and certiorari to quash a decision which failed to meet
the common law requirement to give reasons and remit it for reconsidera-
tion.111 For now, Mount Sinai stands as a rare example of a more substan-
tive remedy—the direct grant of the benefit sought.112
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108 Thanks to Lorne Sossin for alerting me to this point—as he suggests, the line between justi-
fication as transparency and justification as immunity from accountability is a thin one.
109 On this last point, see David Mullan’s chapter in this volume. He argues that the courts,
using Baker, have confirmed and increased deference to discretionary and executive decision-
making, particularly with respect to the national security concerns including access to sensitive
information. In administrative law in general and national security contexts in particular,
Mullan argues that what has not yet resulted is optimal coherence within administrative law
jurisprudence around standards of review. The courts have not calibrated deference so that it
is most intense where it is most needed and there remains a persistent tendency to revert to cat-
egorical labelling as a solution when confronted by difficult conflicts of fact and law.
110 See Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748 on
expertise at para 62: ‘Expertise loses a right to deference when it is not defensible.’ Iacobucci J
for the court suggested that expertise is demonstrated in an administrative decision through
well-informed, rational, cogent, and coherent conclusions.
111 See JLH Sprague, ‘Remedies for the Failure to Provide Reasons’ (2000) 13 Canadian
Journal of Administrative Law and Practice 209–23. Sprague argues that the proper remedy
for a failure to give reasons should be mandamus whereas certiorari should be reserved for 
the rare cases when it is impossible to provide reasons and ‘even then only when such action is
justified by the role played by the reasons in the particular scheme.’ On Sprague’s account, rea-
sons do not go to the correctness/validity of the decision or its fairness. Ibid at 222–23. In con-
trast, David Mullan suggests that no hard and fast rule regarding the appropriate remedy
exists. However, quashing and remission may be the most appropriate response to the failure
to provide reasons while ordering the provision of reasons may satisfy the functional concern
regarding effective review or appeal. He recommends that the substantive approach—the grant
or a direction to grant the benefit the applicant is seeking—’remain a reserve possibility.’
Mullan, Administrative Law, n 27 at 317–18.
112 Both decisions employed mandamus to compel the issuance of the permit, albeit for differ-
ent reasons. The remedy is all the more extraordinary since it was used against the Crown and
the court specifically rejected the argument put forward that the Crown should retain immu-
nity from this writ (Mount Sinai, n 85 at para 117). 
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THE BAKER ETHOS: THE AORTA OF CANADIAN LAW?
Many commentators would concur in the assessment that Baker is one of
the ‘most significant administrative law judgements ever delivered by the
Supreme Court of Canada’.113 Baker confirms the existence of a unified
methodology: a pragmatic and contextual application of three standards of
review revealing an overall ‘deference as respect’ approach to the adminis-
trative state, combined with a framework deeply evocative of a substantive
conception of the rule of law. The ‘bottom line’ significance is that discre-
tionary decisions must be exercised in accordance with the ‘boundaries
imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of
administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the
principles of the Charter’114; otherwise, they will not be respected by either
the courts or the general public.
In this concluding section, however, I will assert that Baker is more
important than even initially thought for three reasons. First, the duty to
give reasons stands as a substantive instantiation of the rule of law.115
Therefore, what many judges labelled a ‘substantive’ as opposed to a purely
procedural approach was the correct characterisation of the Baker ethos.116
However, I do not agree that such an approach always intrudes on the merits
of the initial decision or that it always guarantees the result that the claimant
would like. As I have argued, a competent and fair decision-making process
combined with a decision that recognises individual rights and interests and
provides adequate reasons should usually command respect from a
reviewer.
Second, Baker’s unified approach may inform the legal order as a 
whole. Looking at the pre-and post-Baker landscape illustrates that 
this methodology is not only confined to Baker and administrative law, 
but is pertinent for all public law117 and perhaps beyond to specific
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113 D Mullan, ‘Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)—A Defining
Moment in Canadian Administrative Law’ (1999) 7 Reid’s Administrative Law 145 at 146.
See also L Sossin, ‘Developments in Administrative Law: The 1998–99 Term’ (2000) 11
Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 37 at 99.
114 Baker at para 56.
115 David Dyzenhaus and Evan Fox-Decent suggest that Baker exemplifies the principle of
legality. See ‘Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction’ (2001) 51 University of Toronto
Law Journal 193–242 at 238–42.
116 Here I disagree with Binnie J in Mount Sinai in his discussion about why the doctrine of
legitimate expectations is limited to procedural rather than substantive relief. He uses this dis-
cussion to affirm the distinction between the procedural and the substantive though he
acknowledges that ‘in some cases it is difficult to distinguish the procedural from the substan-
tive’ (n 85 at para 35). At least with respect to reasons and reasonableness, I concur with
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent that Baker fuses them. See above n 115.
117 Analogous approaches can be found in Charter cases both in approaches to analysing rights
in context and in relation to the specific provisions in the Charter, in s 1, and in the standard
technique of statutory interpretation. See also D Mullan in Administrative Law, n 27 at 108,
characterising Baker’s extension of the pragmatic and functional approach to abuse of discretion
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instances of private law118. Indeed, equitable concerns about standards and
proper behaviour inform both private and public law.119 Such an approach
avoids formalism and positivism in order to ground a decision in the sub-
stantive context and enables the judicial decision-maker to call into 
play many kinds of authority.120 One interesting nexus concerning fairness
between the private and the public has occurred in cases involving mistreat-
ment of individuals within certain corporate communal organisations 
such as religious colonies.121 It would seem that a modified version of the
body of public law regarding procedural justice I have outlined here could
apply to decisions made that impinge on individual rights and interests
within such communities. In contrast to private law, however, the standard
used to judge behaviour in administration and governance is constitutive of
the character of the polity—in Canada, then, a liberal and constitutional
democracy combined with a rule-of-law state.
Finally, the Baker ethos provides the strongest jurisprudential link
between the rule of law and democracy. The idea of the justificatory 
democratic state may be best exemplified in the finding of the duty 
to give reasons in public law and coheres with the substantive understand-
ing of the rule of law the Supreme Court has recently articulated in 
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as the provision of ‘an overarching or unifying theory for review of the substantive decision of
all manner of statutory and prerogative decision makers.’
118 For a decision that applies Sheppard to the family law context, see CAS v Alberta (Director
of Child Welfare) [2002] AJ No 895, 2002 ABQB 631.
119 Equity has often supervised economic relations to impose standards of behaviour. See
Sossin for an argument why the duty to give reasons in administrative law is equitable and
that equitable principles inform public law duties based on a reconception of the fiduciary
model in public law relationships and of authority as political trust. See ‘Public Fiduciary
Obligations,’ n 35.
120 According to Jeffery Berryman, the methodology employed in courts of equity did not dis-
tinguish between fact and law resulting in an approach characterised as ‘pragmatic, robust,
and highly contextualized.’ J Berryman, The Law of Equitable Remedies (Toronto, Irwin Law,
2000) at 2.
121 See most recently Waldner v Ponderosa Hutterian Brethren [2003] AJ No 7, 2003 ABQB 6
which is a subsidiary case to a larger claim about procedural impropriety. This case concerns
whether several members were improperly expelled from a Hutterian religious community
because they were not afforded proper notice of the proposed expulsion nor were they given
explicit reasons for such expulsion; significant property interests were at play as property is
held in common in these communities and members are cared for until death. In an interesting
link to Baker, the member who brought forward the suit was expelled but his wife was allowed
to remain in the community. As with Mount Sinai, this case provides an example of overlap-
ping public and private law doctrines as expulsion here could be thought analogous to wrong-
ful dismissal. The Alberta court declared that the expulsion was invalid and granted an interim
injunction to require reinstatement to his status before expulsion pending completion of the
action regarding the evidence about procedural merits of the expulsion. The court would not
interfere with what sanctions the community imposed prior to the wrongful expulsion and
cautioned that the final determination of appropriate discipline rested in the decision-making
body of the community. Other cases of this type include Hofer v Wollman, [1992] 3 SCR 165
and several early cases concerning memberships in associations.
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the Secession Reference.122 In this new understanding, administrative 
tribunals remain the ‘front-line embodiments of the Rule of Law’123 while
the courts’ participation in democratic governance actualises the rule of law
norms of accountability and transparency. The view that I advance comple-
ments the picture of the rule of law outlined by Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin:
Where a society is marked by a culture of justification, an exercise of public
power is only appropriate where it can be justified to citizens in terms of
rationality and fairness. Arbitrary decision and rules are seen as illegitimate …
most importantly, the ability to call for such a justification as a precondition
to the legitimate exercise of public power is regarded by citizens as their right,
a right which only illegitimate institutions and laws venture to infringe. The
prevalence of such a cultural expectation is, in my view, the definitive marker
of a mature Rule of Law.124
Rather than a standard account of the court’s role which might focus, for
example, on the counter-majoritarian principle, the Baker ethos presents a
different and deeper explanation and justification, tapping into an ethical
framework where the courts evaluate and legitimate a democratically orig-
inating, rule-governed way of life. The exercise of public power that affects
individual rights must be justified to citizens on the bases of fairness,
rationality, and reasonableness. Skeletal, generic, boilerplate, formulaic
reasons cannot serve the function of reminding the political, social and
legal order of the rules of conduct we believe are necessary to regulate our
activities.
The rule of law therefore necessitates the multiple supervision of the
exercise of public power between the executive, the legislative, the adminis-
trative state, the judiciary and the citizenry.125 Determining the scope of
duties owed by government officials in a decision-making context is a joint
task shared between the legislatures which elaborate public purposes, the
executive which animates these purposes and the courts which ensure rea-
sonableness of government action.126 But rather than a contest with 
only one winner, the object of the game of public law is for the players to
better understand the rules of the game through their mutual participation
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122 In the Secession Reference, the Supreme Court suggested that: ‘A political system must also
possess legitimacy, and in our political culture, that requires an interaction between the rule of
law and the democratic principle.’ Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 
at para 67.
123 McLachlin, n 3 at 189.
124 Ibid at 174.
125 D Dyzenhaus, ‘Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law,’
(2002) 27 Queen’s Law Journal 445–509 at 501–02. See also K Roach, The Supreme Court
on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2001).
126 Ibid at 175.
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in the process of challenging, explaining, and applying these rules in 
concrete situations.127 Courts and tribunals should be co-operative players
in the game of administrative justice. Deference as respect ought then to
facilitate power-sharing and aim to foster institutional respect for other
bodies’ competencies—this is the type of co-ordination intended by
Baker.128
It is, of course, the affected individual or individuals, citizen or non-citizen,
who provide the participatory stamp because they themselves have engaged
the process. The procedural protection afforded by the duty to give reasons
accords with a view of democracy that is participatory and therefore
respects individual agency by facilitating the exercise of moral responsibility
and by providing fair procedures that treat the individual as a whole person
thereby respecting human dignity.129 The Baker ethos manifests a sophisti-
cated conception of participation in legal processes which complements
democratic participation in political processes. I have argued that the Baker
ethos embeds this conception in the duty to give reasons.
Baker, the Duty to Give Reasons 141
127 For a brief analysis of this ‘activity-oriented’ view of democracy and constitutionalism, see
J Tully, ‘The Unattained Yet Attainable Democracy: Canada and Quebec Face the New
Century’ (Montréal, Programme d’études sur le Québec de L’Université McGill, 2000). In this
essay, he writes: that ‘[c]onstitutional democracy must thus be seen as an activity, a system of
discursive practices of rule following and rule modifying in which diversity is reconciled with
unity through the continuous exchange of public reasons.’ Ibid at 17.
128 Genevieve Cartier calls this the ‘Baker effect,’ a term that she unpacks in her paper in this
volume. 
129 See DJ Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures A Study of Administrative Procedures
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), TRS Allan’s review of this book, ‘Procedural Fairness and
the Duty of Respect’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 497–515, and P Craig, ‘Public
Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory’ (2000) Public Law 211–39.
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